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We develop a game theoretial model of N heterogeneous interating agents alled the intelli-
gent minority game. The intelligent agents play the basi minority game and depending on their
performanes, generate new strategies using the one-point geneti rossover mehanism. The per-
formanes hange dramatially and the game moves rapidly to an eient state (utuations in the
number of agents performing a partiular ation, haraterized by σ2, reahes a low value). There
is no phase transition when we vary σ2/N with 2M/N , where M is the memory of an agent.
The dynamis of interating agents ompeting for
sare resoures are believed to underlie the behaviour of
omplex systems in natural [1, 2, 3℄ and soial [4, 5℄ si-
enes. The agents have to be the best in order to survive
similar to the idea of survival of the ttest in biol-
ogy. In studies of market behaviour, tools of statistial
physis have been ombined with theories of eonomis
[6, 7, 8, 9℄, like game theory, whih deals with deision
making of a number of rational opponents under ondi-
tions of onit and ompetition [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15℄.
In this letter, we present a game theoretial model
of a large number of heterogeneous interating agents
alled the intelligent minority game, based on the mi-
nority game [11℄. This provides an alternative to the
representative approah of miroeonomis, where one
has a theory with a single (representative) agent, based
on the assumption that all the agents are idential [16℄.
The minority game model onsists of agents having a -
nite number of strategies and nite amount of publi in-
formation, interating through a global quantity (whose
value is xed by all the agents) representing a market
mehanism. In the original model the agents hoose their
strategy through a simple adaptive dynamis based on
indutive reasoning [5℄. Here, we introdue the fat that
the agents are intelligent and in order to be the best or
survive in the market, modify their strategies periodi-
ally depending on their performanes. For modifying
the strategies, we hoose the mehanism of one-point ge-
neti rossover, following the ideas of geneti algorithms
in omputer siene and operations researh. In fat,
these algorithms were inspired by the proesses observed
in natural evolution [17, 18, 19℄ and it turned out that
they solve some extremely ompliated problems with-
out knowledge of the deoded world. In nature, one-point
rossover ours when two parents exhange parts of their
orresponding hromosomes after a seleted point, reat-
ing osprings [19℄.
The basi minority game onsists of an odd number of
agents N who an perform only two ations, at a given
time t, and an agent wins the game if it is one of the
members of the minority group. The two ations, suh
as buying or selling ommodities, are denoted here by
0 or 1. Further, it is assumed that all the agents have
aess to nite amount of publi information, whih is a
ommon bit-string memory of the M most reent out-
omes. Thus the agents are said to exhibit bounded
rationality [5℄. For example, in ase of memory M = 2
there are P = 2M = 4 possible history bit strings: 00,
01, 10 and 11. A strategy onsists of a response, i.e., 0
or 1, to eah possible history bit strings; therefore, there
are G = 2P = 22
M
= 16 possible strategies whih onsti-
tute the total strategy spae. In our study, we use the
redued strategy spae by piking only the unorrelated
strategies (whih have Hamming distane dH = 1/2) [20℄.
At the beginning of the game, eah agent randomly piks
k strategies, and after a game, assigns one virtual point
to the strategies whih would have predited the orret
outome; the best strategy is the one whih has the high-
est virtual point. The performane of the player is mea-
sured by the number of times the player wins, and the
strategy, whih the player uses to win, gets a real point.
We also keep a reord of the number of agents who have
hosen a partiular ation, say, selling denoted by 1,
N1(t) as a funtion of time. The utuations in the be-
haviour of N1(t) indiate the total utility of the system.
For example, we may have a situation where only one
player is in the minority and thus wins, and all the other
players lose. The other extreme ase is when (N − 1)/2
players are in the minority and (N + 1)/2 players lose.
The total utility of the system is highest for the latter
ase as the total number of the agents who win is maxi-
mum. Therefore, the system is more eient when there
are smaller utuations around the mean than when the
utuations are larger. The utuations an be hara-
terized by the variane σ2 so that smaller values of σ2
would orrespond to a more eient state.
In our model, the players of the basi minority game
are assumed to be intelligent and modify their strate-
gies after every time-interval τ depending on their per-
formanes. If they nd that they are among the fration
n (where 0 < n < 1) of the worst performing players, they
modify any two of their strategies hosen randomly from
the pool of k strategies and use one of the new strate-
gies generated. The mehanism by whih they modify
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Figure 1: Shemati diagram to show the mehanism of
one-point geneti rossover to produe new strategies. The
strategies si and sj are the parents. We hoose the breaking
point randomly and through this one-point geneti rossover,
the hildren sk and sl are produed.
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Figure 2: Plots of the performanes of the best player (blak),
the worst player (magenta) and two randomly seleted players
(green and blue) in (a) the basi minority game, where N =
1001, M = 5, k = 10 and t = 1999, and (b) in the intelligent
minority game, where N = 1001, M = 5, k = 10, t = 1999,
n = 0.3 and τ = 100.
their strategies is that of one-point geneti rossover il-
lustrated shematially in Figure 1. The strategies si
and sj at as the parents and by hoosing the breaking
point in them randomly, and performing one-point ge-
neti rossover, the hildren sk and sl are produed. We
should note that the strategies are hanged by the agents
themselves and even though the strategy spae evolves, it
is still of the same size and dimension; thus onsiderably
dierent from earlier attempts [11, 21, 22℄.
In Figure 2, the performanes of the players in our
model are ompared with those in the basi minority
game. We have saled the performanes of all the play-
ers suh that the mean is zero for easy omparison of the
suess of the agents in eah ase. We nd that there are
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Figure 3: Plots of the (a) time-variation of N1 for the basi
minority game (b) time-variation of N1 for the intelligent mi-
nority game () histogram of N1 for the basi minority game
and (d) histogram of N1 for the intelligent minority game.
The simulations for the basi minority game have been made
with N = 1001, M = 5, k = 10 and t = 1999 and for the
intelligent minority game with N = 1001, M = 5, k = 10,
t = 1999, n = 0.3 and τ = 100.
signiant dierenes in the performanes of the players.
The performane of a player in the basi minority game
does not hange drastially in the ourse of the game as
shown in Figure 2 (a). However, in our model, the per-
formanes of the players may hange dramatially even
after initial downfalls, and agents often do better after
they have produed new strategies with the one-point
geneti rossovers, as illustrated in Figure 2 (b).
In order to study the eieny of the game, we plot
the time-variation of N1 for the basi minority game in
omparison to our model in Figures 3 (a) and (b). Also
the histograms of N1 for the basi minority game and our
model are plotted in Figures 3 () and (d). Clearly evi-
dent from these gures is the fat that when we allow one-
point geneti rossovers in strategies, the system moves
toward a more eient state sine the utuations in N1
dereases and the histogram of N1 beomes narrower and
sharper. We have also studied the eet of inreasing the
fration of players n on the distributions of the number of
swithes and the number of geneti rossovers the players
make. The results in Figure 4 illustrate the fat that as
n inreases, more players have to make large number of
swithes and rossovers in order to be the best.
Furthermore, we alulate the variane σ2 of N1. The
variation of σ2/N against the parameter 2M/N for the
basi minority game, have been studied in details in refs.
[12, 20, 21, 22℄. We show the variation of σ2/N with the
parameter 2M/N for k = 2 in Figure 5 (a) for both the
games, by varying M and N . Also, we plot the quan-
tity σ2/N against M (varied from 2 to 12) for N = 1001
players and dierent values of k, in Figure 5 (b). For
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Figure 4: The histograms of the number of swithes the
players make in the intelligent minority game for (a) n = 0.3
(b) n = 0.4 () n = 0.5, and the histograms of the number of
geneti rossovers the players make in the intelligent minority
game for (d) n = 0.3 (e) n = 0.4 and (f) n = 0.5. The
simulations have been made with N = 1001, M = 4, k = 10,
t = 1999 and τ = 10.
k = 2, the quantity σ2/N is minimum in the basi mi-
nority game when 2M/N ≈ 0.5 and there is a phase
transition at this value [12, 20, 21, 22℄. As we inrease
the value of k the eieny dereases and this transition
nally smoothens out. However, in the intelligent minor-
ity game, we nd no suh phase transition for any ombi-
nations of k, M and N , we have studied. We found that
as the value of k is inreased, the eieny dereases,
but at a rate muh smaller than in the basi minority
game. For both games, the values of σ2/N seem to on-
verge towards a ommon value for large values of M . If
we ompare the two games, we nd that for large k val-
ues and moderate values of M , the dierenes in σ2/N
is very large.
We have observed that in our model, the worst players
were often those who swithed strategies most frequently
while the best players were those who made the least
number of swithes after nding a good strategy. Fur-
ther, we found that the players who do not make any
geneti rossovers are unable to ompete with those who
make geneti rossovers, and their performanes were
found to utuate around the zero mean. Moreover,
it was found that as the rossover time-interval τ is in-
reased, the time for the system to reah an eient state
is longer [23℄.
One advantage of our model is learly that the dimen-
sionality of the strategy spae as well as the number of
elements in the strategy spae remain the same. It is also
appealing that starting from a small number of strategies,
many good strategies an be generated by the players in
the ourse of the game. Even though the players may not
have performed well initially, they often did better when
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Figure 5: (a) The plot of σ2/N against the parameter 2M/N
for k = 2, by varying M from 2 to 11 and N from 25 to 1001
for the basi minority game (red squares) and the intelligent
minority game (blak asterisk marks). The simulations were
made for t = 5000 and ten dierent samples in eah ase.
The parameter values hosen for the intelligent minority game
were τ = 10 and n = 50. (b) The plot of σ2/N against M
for dierent values of k for the basi minority game and the
intelligent minority game. For the basi minority game, we
have studied the ases of k = 2 (magenta diamonds), k =
6 (blue squares) and k = 10 (blak ross marks). For the
intelligent minority game, we have studied the ases of k = 2
(brown asterisk marks), k = 6 (green triangles) and k = 10
(red irles). The simulations for the basi minority game
have been made with N = 1001 and t = 5000, and for the
intelligent minority game have been made with N = 1001,
t = 5000, n = 50 and τ = 10, and for ve dierent samples in
eah ase.
they used new strategies generated by the one-point ge-
neti rossovers. Finally, it should be pointed out that
even in the framework of geneti algorithms, there are
various ways to generate new strategies. One possibility
is that we make a one-point geneti rossover between the
two worst strategies and replae the parents by the hil-
dren. Another possibility is to make hybridized geneti
rossover where we make a one-point geneti rossover
between the two best strategies, replae the worst two
4strategies with the hildren and retain the parents as well.
We defer these modiations and interesting results for
a future ommuniation [23℄.
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